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Definition and Institutional Fit 
 
 
Ina Möller 
 
Abstract 
Geoengineering technologies are by definition only effective at scale, and so international 
policy development of some sort will be unavoidable. It is therefore important to include this 
dimension when assessing the technologies’ feasibility and potential role in addressing climate 
change. The few existing studies that address this question indicate that policy development at 
the international level will be exceedingly difficult. This study provides an in-depth, 
theoretically informed analysis about why this might be the case. Using data in the form of 
negotiation proceedings, observations, and key-informant interviews with government officials 
from seven different countries, it argues that a significant part of the challenge lies in 
dissonances between problem definitions that characterize the geoengineering governance 
debate, and the structures and expectations that shape global environmental governance. These 
include a lack of institutional fit between the process-based differentiation of geoengineering 
technologies (CDR and SRM) and the international legal architecture; a lack of fit between the 
urgency of demanded governance action and prevalent scientific and political uncertainties; 
and a lack of fit between risk-risk trade-off narratives and the precautionary norms of 
environmental governance. 
 
 
 
 
In recent years, suggestions to use geoengineering technologies to counter the climate crisis 
have spawned a dynamic debate amongst scientists and other non-state actors.1 Prominent 
studies project that removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and/or reflecting incoming 
sunlight at scale, could become tools in slowing down climate change (Rogelj et al. 2018, Irvine 
et al. 2019). But because the economic incentives to develop and deploy these technologies 
within projected time-frames are lacking, scientific authorities like the British Royal Society 
(2018) or the US National Academy of Sciences (2015) recommend government support to 
stimulate research and economic investment. Meanwhile, the European Academies Science 
Advisory Council warns that overoptimistic expectations about carbon dioxide removal 
                                               
1 Geoengineering technologies describe large-scale, intentional interventions into natural systems in 
order to stabilize global temperatures. Prominent examples include planting and processing massive 
amounts of biomass to capture and sequester atmospheric carbon dioxide (Bioenergy with Carbon 
Capture and Storage – BECCS), or artificially injecting reflective particles into the stratosphere to 
reflect incoming sunlight (Stratospheric Aerosol Injection – SAI). 
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technologies (CDR) could have serious social and ecological side-effects, and that decision 
makers should be prudent when considering them as policy options (EASAC 2018). 
Multidisciplinary assessments of solar radiation management technologies (SRM) express 
comparable warnings, recommending anticipatory governance to manage research trajectories 
and highlighting the need for multi-stakeholder engagement at international level (Chhetri et 
al. 2018). 
 
How do such recommendations for geoengineering governance resonate with policy makers? 
The few studies that examine this question show that government actors across the ideological 
board express concerns about technical feasibility and risk, but also about the political 
difficulties of governing geoengineering technologies. Huttunen et al. (2014) conclude that 
clear differences in the framing of geoengineering-related policy documents between the 
United States and Germany promise significant difficulties for international policy 
development. Himmelsbach (2018) finds that scientists who advise the European Commission 
anticipate problems of distributive justice and the general complexity of governing climate 
change. And in their survey of US-based environmental policy professionals, Talati & Higgins 
(2019) find a prevalent assessment that governance at national or international level will be 
significantly more difficult than at institutional or scientific level. 
 
The anticipated political difficulties pose a significant problem in the face of recommendations 
to govern these emerging technologies. Geoengineering, both in the form of CDR and SRM, is 
by definition only effective at scale and will eventually require international engagement of 
some sort. It is therefore imperative that the governability of these technologies is included in 
assessments of whether and how they can offer effective responses to climate change. 
 
This study provides an in-depth, theoretically informed analysis of the challenges that policy 
makers face when creating governance mechanisms for geoengineering. Notably, it draws on 
key-informant interviews with government officials who are already familiar with 
geoengineering. They provide valuable insights about how policy makers reflect on 
geoengineering technologies, and the methods by which they try to make them governable. The 
study discusses both CDR and SRM in order to better understand policy makers reasoning 
around commonalities such as scale, international collaboration, and anticipatory nature. 
 
In the theory section, I suggest an analytical framework that conceptualizes the creation of new 
institutions as a process in which policy makers need to create ‘institutional fit’ between an 
existing problem definition and the context in which they work. In the methods section, I 
explain how I use policy relevant literature to identify common problem definitions in the 
expert debate on geoengineering governance, and interviews, observations of deliberations, 
and negotiation proceedings to study the performance of these problem definitions in a policy 
making context. In the analysis, I give an overview of common problem definitions and then 
apply the analytical framework to three areas where a widely spread problem definition lacks 
institutional fit. The conclusions summarize and suggest pathways forward. 
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Problem Definition and Institutional Fit 
Problem definition and institutional fit are concepts that highlight the importance of structure 
for individual action. They also allow the researcher to examine how an agent navigates and 
changes the structures that surround them, thereby expressing agency. Introducing such a dual-
nature perspective is necessary for scholars to go beyond understanding the internal structures 
of expert driven discourses on geoengineering (e.g. Anshelm & Hansson (2014), Talati & 
Higgins (2019)). To understand what these discourses mean for the policy making process, it 
is necessary to examine their performance in an institutional context. 
 
The concept ‘problem definition’ describes the way in which an issue is defined in order to 
inform the shape and content of a policy or institutional set-up. Its function in a political 
discourse is “at once to explain, to describe, to recommend, and above all, to persuade” 
(Rochefort & Cobb 1994, p.15). The concept is used in constructivist, post-modernist and 
policy analysis literature to emphasize the importance of language for understanding the 
dynamics of policy making. Importantly, it highlights that at the level of language, social 
problems are malleable, and that actors can use problem definitions to steer the course of a 
given political development.  
 
Problem definition is usually applied in analyses of how politicians and journalists frame a 
social issue in the media. In this context, dimensions like magnitude, severity, proximity and 
crisis play an important role in determining whether or not a social issue makes it onto the 
policy agenda (Rochefort & Cobb 1994). The purpose of this study, however, is to understand 
what happens when a given problem definition, already pre-defined by experts or advocates, 
meets the institutional context of policy makers. To study this process, I follow the assumptions 
of organizational theorists James March and Johan Olsen (2011), who argue that political 
actions are determined by a logic of contextual appropriateness. Policy making is a process of 
collective negotiation and takes place in an environment structured by laws, bureaucratic 
procedures, expectations and values. In addition to their own preferences, policy makers need 
to take into account these structures when creating new institutions.   
 
To describe the necessity of matching problem definitions and institutional context, I borrow 
the term ‘institutional fit’ from Lejano & Shankar (2013). In their theory of institutional 
contextualism, the authors highlight problems that arise when a generic blueprint of an 
institutional structure is applied to a local context without accounting for the specific conditions 
of that context.2 They write that “the ability to tailor programs to the particular needs of a target 
community has become a central tenet in the literature on designing institutions under 
complexity” (p.84). These ‘target communities,’ I argue, can be found at all stages of institution 
building. The process of creating institutional fit happens not only amongst local implementers 
who adapt international programs to their given circumstances, but also amongst policy makers 
                                               
2 The contextualist definition of institutional fit that I use here differs from the problem structural 
definition suggested by Oran Young (2002), who uses the term to emphasize that institutional 
arrangements should match ‘the defining features of the problems that they address’ [p.20]. 
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who engage with problem definitions delivered by the scientific community or other 
governance advocates. Institution building is characterized as a ‘constant dialectic’ between 
the problem definition and the context in which this definition needs to be translated into a 
governance mechanism.  
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework for studying institutional fit 
 
 
 
Combining problem definition and institutional fit creates an analytical  framework that focuses 
on the role of an agent in relation to their structural context (Figure 1). It assumes that agency 
exists in the agent’s capacity to understand the relation between a given problem definition and 
the bureaucratic, legal or normative structures that this problem would need to be addressed in. 
Further agency exists in the capacity to create ‘institutional fit’ by adapting the problem 
definition and/or parts of the institutional context to facilitate the creation of new governance 
mechanisms. In the process, the adaptation of problem definitions and institutional context can 
be done strategically to shape the resulting governance mechanism according to the agent’s 
preferences. 
 
Whether this adaptation process eventually leads to a new institution is subject to contextual 
factors. They include the size in discrepancy between problem definition and institutional 
context; the ease with which the problem definition or institutional context can be adapted; the 
degree of homogeneity in the preferences of agents involved in the negotiation process; the 
commitment of participating agents to finding a solution; as well as external developments that 
may impede or facilitate the decision making process (think ‘windows of opportunity’, as 
discussed in Kindgon’s (1984) theory of the policy cycle). Creating institutional fit is always 
accompanied by other political processes that must be taken into account when explaining 
success or failure in creating new governance mechanisms. 
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The analytical framework focuses on one process within the larger policy making cycle, namely 
what policy makers do when they are confronted with a problem definition delivered by experts 
or advocates, and how they try to make this problem governable. Particularly in technical areas 
such as climate change or environmental policy more generally, scientific discourse plays a 
central role in delivering problem definitions and has been shown to take substantial influence 
on the shape of governing institutions. Allan (2017) demonstrates this for the case of climate 
change in general, and Boettcher (2019) argues that it is also the case for geoengineering. The 
purpose of analyzing the interface between science and policy through a theoretical lens of 
institutional fit is to highlight the agency that policy makers have in making the problem 
definitions of scientific discourse governable. 
Methods 
Identifying Problem Definitions 
To identify important geoengineering problem definitions, I analyze thirteen geoengineering 
assessments written for policy makers. These were published between 2010 and 2019 by non-
state actors (only the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is included as a semi-
state actor). The variety of authoritative scientific bodies, committees and non-profit 
organizations distributing these assessments supply a reasonably broad net for capturing 
problem definitions. Yet all reports were written in English, and the results are limited to the 
English-speaking discussion on geoengineering. 
 
I follow the analytical framework suggested by Armeni & Redgwell (2015), asking what 
geoengineering is defined as, why it is considered a problem, how and when the problem should 
be solved, and who should be responsible. These questions are analyzed for each assessment 
and systematically compared to find overarching commonalities. A clear answer to each 
question was frequently provided in the introduction, executive summary, or early parts of the 
assessment. In the case of the IPCC’s 1.5°C report, the analysis focused on the sections 
discussing geoengineering technologies (Section 1.4: Strengthening the Global Response, and 
Chapter 4: Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response). 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the most prominent problem definition in each assessment. 
These summaries are not comprehensive or complete, but aim to capture the strongest 
overarching message. They are grouped according to similarity of problem definition and 
similarity of policy proposal. This means that in problem definition one, reports that expressly 
refrain from judging the desirability of geoengineering technologies are grouped together with 
reports that express their possible necessity. The reason for this is that all of these reports 
strongly recommend dedicated institution building around one or several geoengineering 
technologies in order to prepare for any eventualities. Furthermore, they do not display the 
explicit focus on mitigation deterrence or scientific agnosticism that characterize problem 
definitions two and three. 
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Studying Institutional Fit 
To study the performance of geoengineering problem definitions in a policy making context, I 
apply a form of deliberative policy analysis as discussed by Frank Fischer in Hajer & Wagenaar 
(2003). This interpretive approach brings together a wide range of data and emphasizes the 
assessment of a problem in its particular context. It requires studying deliberations and 
moments of contestation in the concrete, every-day practices and activities of political decision 
makers. The method aims to ‘tease out’ the normative conflicts that underlie different 
interpretations of the same goal, seeking to enable constructive action based on given 
circumstances. 
 
The analyzed data includes interviews with government officials, negotiation proceedings, and 
observations of deliberations. Eight interviews were conducted with government officials from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Kenya and China. All 
interviewees had engaged with geoengineering in the context of their work, and had a good 
understanding of their government’s procedures and positions at both national and international 
level. Some worked towards informing their government’s policy on energy, environment or 
climate change, others were involved in the negotiations of international environmental 
agreements.  
 
My questions concerned how the interviewees had become aware of geoengineering, how they 
perceived it, and the obstacles they encountered in working with it. Questions were asked in a 
way that encouraged reflection, often probing why certain actions were taken or certain events 
happened. Although the interviewees did not always know the answer, their speculations 
provided important insights to norms and expectations held in the policy making context. Due 
to the research question, my main interest was in the performance of geoengineering problem 
definitions at the international level. However, the bottom-up nature of the discussion (i.e. 
states and non-state actors introducing the issue into international fora rather than vice-versa) 
included analyzing perceptions and expectations at national and sometimes local level. 
Although low in quantity, these interviews provided valuable insights into policy makers’ 
reasoning around geoengineering. 
 
Proceedings focused on events in which some sort of political engagement with geoengineering 
took place. Internationally, these are the negotiation of marine geoengineering regulation under 
the London Convention and the London Protocol (LC/LP), the decision on geoengineering 
made in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the draft resolution on 
geoengineering discussed in the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA). Reports of 
the Earth Negotiations Bulletin were particularly helpful, but also broader analyses like those 
provided by Dixon et al. (2014) or Fuentes-George (2017). I also analyzed publicly available 
documents in which governments explicitly position themselves towards geoengineering in 
reaction to inquiries from parliament or from the public, as well as recent national climate 
policies for their reference to geoengineering technologies. 
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Observations of deliberations took place at conferences and events in which government actors 
engaged with the geoengineering topic. These include two major scientific conferences; 
observations made at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) COP23; and observations made in attending an internal workshop of the German 
Agency for the Environment. By ‘observations’, I mean in-the-corridor conversations with 
government actors who attended these events, speeches or presentations given by government 
representatives or advisers, and observations of how government actors engaged with or 
questioned the geoengineering-related science that was being presented. 
 
To identify areas where institutional fit was lacking, I focused on finding conflicts and 
inconsistencies in the reasoning of policy makers. These were expressed through reticence, 
frustration, confusion or emotional reaction. If such conflicts or inconsistencies were recurrent 
with respect to a particular element of common geoengineering problem definitions, I included 
this element as a case for further analysis. Each case was then analyzed according to the 
analytical framework, comprising the scientific problem definition, the institutional context in 
which it caused conflict, the structure of this conflict, any (suggested) strategies for resolving 
the conflict, any resulting institutions, and the contextual factors that facilitated or impeded the 
formation of an institution. 
Problem Definitions in Geoengineering 
Assessments 
The analysis of thirteen geoengineering assessments, published by various actors between 2010 
and 2019, reveals three overarching problem definitions describing the need to engage with 
geoengineering technologies (summarized in Table 1.) 
 
The first argues that mitigation is not enough to stop the damaging effects of climate change, 
and that some form of geoengineering is inevitable. Immediate scale-up of CDR technologies 
is considered necessary, requiring governance primarily in the form of investment. SRM 
(prevalently in the form of Stratospheric Aerosol Injection - SAI) is considered as a tool that 
may be necessary in case of a climate emergency, but that could also be deployed by (other) 
unilateral actors. The subsequent recommendation is that capacity to manage unilateral or 
multilateral deployment should be initiated immediately, through both national and 
international institutions. A moratorium on any kind of geoengineering deployment is 
dismissed as unrealistic. 
 
The second expresses a warning that geoengineering technologies are a dangerous distraction, 
with low potential for effectiveness and high risk of preventing a transition away from the use 
of fossil fuels. A recurring concern in this problem definition is that research and investment 
in geoengineering will divert valuable resources away from mitigation and adaptation funds 
needed in the Global South. It also highlights global power imbalances, and the exclusion of 
poorer and marginalized populations in the decision making process. As a result, it demands 
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absolute prioritization of mitigation and adaptation, an inclusive discussion on the desirability 
of geoengineering technologies, and a moratorium on the deployment of SAI. 
 
The third recognizes geoengineering technologies as options in the climate change policy 
portfolio, but highlights the great uncertainties that still characterize these technologies. It 
refrains from giving direct policy advice beyond the need for more research on the feasibility 
of different technologies. It tends to emphasize problems of sustainability and equity, rather 
than the technologies’ potential to provide effective solutions. But in the face of mitigation 
costs and difficulties, it recommends keeping all options open. 
 
 
Table 1: Problem definitions used in geoengineering assessments 
Summary of 
Problem 
Definition 
2010–2012 2015–2017 2018 2019 Policy Proposal 
1: Geo- 
engineering 
may be 
inevitable, we 
need to prepare 
for it. 
Bipartisan 
Policy Center 
2011: 
Climate 
remediation is 
characterized 
by uncertainties 
in risk, cost and 
physical 
limitations, but 
may be needed 
in case of 
emergency. 
US National 
Academy of 
Sciences 2015: 
Mitigation will 
not be enough. 
Large-scale 
CDR is needed. 
Albedo 
modification is 
still uncertain, 
but could be 
needed (or 
used by others) 
in the event of a 
climate 
emergency. 
UK Royal 
Society 
2018: 
Emissions 
reductions 
will not be 
enough. GGR 
technologies 
are needed in 
the second half 
of the century, 
but are not 
yet well under- 
stood. 
..........................
.. 
 
Chhetri et al. 
2018: 
The growing 
conversation 
about SRM 
calls for robust 
anticipatory 
governance, 
no matter 
whether one 
supports or 
disapproves of 
the technology. 
Stavins & 
Stowe 
2019:  
It is a matter 
of time before 
countries or 
other actors 
attempt to 
deploy solar 
geo- 
engineering. 
..........................
.. 
 
C2G2 2019: 
The urgency of 
climate change 
makes 
consideration of 
geo- 
engineering 
necessary, 
but raises 
concerns about 
ecological 
impacts, moral 
hazard, 
institutional 
lock-in 
and unilateral 
deployment, 
requiring 
governance. 
Invest in and 
up-scale CDR 
technologies. 
Build 
knowledge, 
institutions and 
capacity at 
multiple levels 
to prevent or 
manage 
unilateral or 
multilateral use 
of SRM 
(excluding a 
moratorium). 
2: Geo- 
engineering is a 
dangerous 
distraction, we 
should not 
count on it. 
ETC group 
2010: 
If rich 
governments 
and industry 
warm to geo- 
engineering as 
a solution to 
climate change, 
Wetter & 
Zundel 
2017: 
Geo- 
engineering is 
being 
normalized as 
virtually 
inevitable by an 
EASAC 2018: 
The lack of 
recognition in 
public and 
political 
debate about 
the severity of 
emission 
reductions 
CIEL 2019: 
Geo- 
engineering 
technologies, 
both CDR and 
SRM, rely on 
and cater to the 
interests and 
infrastructure of 
Place all efforts 
on mitigation. 
Allow for some 
geo- 
engineering 
research, but 
only in 
combination 
with inclusive 
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their money and 
technologies 
will no longer be 
available for 
adaptation 
and mitigation 
in the Global 
South. 
exclusive group 
of experts, while 
developing 
countries, 
indigenous 
peoples and 
local 
communities 
are left 
voiceless. 
required to 
reach 2°C or 
1.5°C could be 
due to over- 
optimistic 
expectations 
about CDR 
technologies. 
the fossil fuel 
industry. They 
also carry high 
risks and 
prevent 
systemic 
change. 
international 
discussions on 
the realistic role 
of these 
technologies. 
Enable a 
moratorium 
on outdoor 
experimentation 
and 
deployment. 
3: Geo- 
engineering is 
an existing 
option, 
with many 
uncertainties. 
IPCC working 
group 2012: 
The ambiguity 
around 
geoengineering 
makes 
productive 
discussion 
difficult. Risks 
and impacts 
should be 
assessed within 
a context of 
risks and 
impacts of 
climate change 
and other 
responses such 
as mitigation 
and adaptation. 
EuTRACE 
2015: 
Despite 
increasing 
presence in 
conversation, it 
is not clear 
whether climate 
engineering can 
ever be used to 
reduce 
climate change, 
for both 
physical and 
social reasons. 
IPCC 2018: 
Achieving the 
1.5°C target 
will be subject 
to high costs. 
Using CDR or 
SRM may 
reduce those 
costs, but could 
have serious 
implications for 
sustainable 
development 
and are subject 
to knowledge 
gaps. 
 Keep all options 
open, maintain 
a holistic 
perspective, 
fill knowledge 
gaps in order to 
facilitate 
decision 
making. 
 
 
The first commonality of these problem definitions is their conceptualization of 
geoengineering. All reports, even those that use a different name, discuss deliberate, large-scale 
interventions into natural systems in order to counteract climate change. Similarly, all reports 
categorize these interventions into CDR and SRM (although different terms are used as titles). 
The trend has been to increasingly separate the two groups, for example by writing separate 
reports or not using an overarching term. Nevertheless, common concerns in terms of side-
effects on social and ecological systems, feasibility of deployment at scale, institutional lock-
in, and distraction from mitigation and adaptation persist for both categories. 
 
A second commonality (visible in the first and second problem definition) is the urgency with 
which international governance is advocated for. In the first problem definition, urgency for 
up-scaling CDR is rationalized based on predictions made by the IPCC. Urgency for SRM 
governance is rationalized through the hazard of unilateral deployment and anticipated loss of 
control. International institutions – ranging from deliberative fora to nuclear proliferation-like 
treaties – are recommended as a way to build capacity for managing potential unilateral or 
multilateral deployment. In the second problem definition, urgency is rationalized based on the 
threat of geoengineering technologies being normalized, and the need for an inclusive and 
diverse discussion. Existing international institutions are called upon to put the potential of 
geoengineering technologies into a realistic perspective, and ensure that any large-scale 
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experimentation or deployment is prohibited in the absence of an inclusive decision making 
process. 
 
A third commonality is the narrative of geoengineering involving trade-offs, although their 
nature varies from definition to definition. The first identifies a trade-off between risk of 
damage from climate change, and risk of damage from geoengineering. The second identifies 
a trade-off between considering geoengineering as a policy option, and the capacity to realize 
meaningful mitigation and adaptation. The third identifies a trade-off between the anticipated 
costs of climate mitigation, and potential negative effects of a technology on sustainable 
development. The desirability of an individual technology is the result of how large the 
respective trade-off is perceived to be. Problem definition one tends to have a comparably 
positive view on BECCS and SAI, as avoiding damage from climate change is considered a 
priority. Problem definition two dismisses BECCS and SAI for their potential to distract from 
mitigation and adaptation, while highlighting the benefits of approaches that encourage a 
transition away from fossil fuel use. Problem definition three remains agnostic in the absence 
of scientific evidence about the effects of geoengineering technologies on sustainable 
development, but prefers solutions that promise cost-reduction and co-benefits. How these 
problem definitions play out in an institutional context is considered in the following section. 
Dissonances in Institutional Fit 
In-depth interviews with policy makers from seven different countries, together with 
observations of deliberations amongst government actors and relevant negotiation proceedings, 
reveal that some common elements of geoengineering problem definitions meet barriers in the 
policy-making context. Particularly important are dissonances with those elements that are 
widely shared across problem definitions: conceptualization, urgency, and trade-offs. 
Scientific Conceptualization and the Global Legal Architecture 
One area where institutional fit seems problematic is between the scientific conceptualization 
of geoengineering (CDR and SRM) and the global legal architecture. The CDR/SRM 
demarcation separates technologies according to the manner in which they affect radiative 
forcing and has fundamentally shaped the scientific and popular understanding of what 
geoengineering is (Gupta & Möller 2019). Because of its consistent use in assessments like 
those above, policy makers share this definition and use it in their deliberations about the issue. 
Yet when it comes to governance questions, the cases below show that other demarcations – 
notably method of deployment, scale, impact and jurisdiction – play a more important role. 
The London Convention and Protocol 
The first case discussed here is the negotiation of the LC/LP amendment on marine 
geoengineering. In 2013, parties adopted an amendment that restricts the use of ocean 
fertilization to well-controlled scientific experiments. The process around this amendment was 
first initiated in 2007, in reaction to a private company’s announcement that they would carry 
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out ocean fertilization experiments off of the coast of Galapagos. Although negotiations were 
initiated in response to a single technology, the advocates who brought the topic to an 
international agenda framed the procedure as a form of ‘geoengineering’. As Fuentes-George 
(2017) lays out, this was a strategic way of defining the experiments as a global threat and 
thereby raising concerns amongst the international community. Already here, problem 
definition played an important role in bringing the subject to the political agenda. 
 
The CDR/SRM demarcation inherent to the geoengineering problem definition caused some 
difficulty in the resulting negotiations, as it wasn’t clear how these groups would fit the 
Protocol’s mandate. A Swedish negotiator explained that “the concern was firstly not to 
overstep the mandate of the cooperation globally, and secondly to bring about a generic 
formulation. That means of course that the way [that geoengineering is] formulated in the 
London Protocol is not necessarily how someone would define it more broadly”. Negotiators 
eventually agreed that only technologies which added substances to the marine environment 
could be included in the amendment, due to the Protocol’s mandate being about marine 
dumping. The new term - ‘marine geoengineering’ - was different from the CDR/SRM 
demarcation often used to define geoengineering, in that it had to distinguish according to 
method of deployment and jurisdiction rather than the technologies’ way of affecting radiative 
forcing. 
 
Figure 2: Lack of fit between scientific problem definition and mandate of London Protocol & 
London Convention 
 
 
 
Figure 2 schematically visualizes this case according to the analytical framework. It provides 
a clear example where the problem definition was adapted by participating policy makers in 
order to fit a relatively static institutional context - the mandate of the LC/LP. Contextual 
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factors that facilitated the creation of a new institution included a shared perception that ocean 
fertilization had negative impacts on the environment and a feeling of relevance due to the fact 
that ocean fertilization efforts (by private actors) had already taken place. The result was a 
consensus amongst negotiating parties that uncontrolled ocean fertilization efforts should be 
prevented. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity 
A similar lack of institutional fit was discussed during a geoengineering governance workshop 
where German officials were preparing a political position for international negotiations. In the 
process, some participants expressed concern regarding the CDR category used in the IPCC’s 
1.5°C report. At stake were the differences between reforestation and the restoration of natural 
ecosystems on the one hand, and afforestation or large-scale industrial systems like BECCS on 
the other. On the one hand, the institutional context of these policy makers emphasized the 
encouragement of sustainable practices and the prevention of unsustainable ones. On the other, 
the CDR category made it difficult to distinguish between those approaches that promised 
ecological and social benefits (small scale, nature based solutions), and those that were 
perceived to have negative effects on humans and ecological systems (large-scale systems with 
heavy impacts on social and ecological dimensions). 
 
The differences in technologies summarized as CDR were also relevant with respect to 
regulation of geoengineering under the CBD. In 2010, the CBD’s parties had adopted decision 
X/33, in which they restricted the use of geoengineering to small-scale scientific experiments 
in controlled settings. Counter-intuitively, the Convention’s decision to discourage 
geoengineering, in combination with the IPCC’s decision to include reforestation and 
restoration as a form of CDR (and therefore geoengineering), could make ecosystem restoration 
relevant to the CBD’s decision. The decision asks governments to ensure that ‘no climate-
related geo-engineering activities** that may affect biodiversity take place’ – a formulation 
that does not by default exclude restoration attempts. Conversely, the IPCC’s definition makes 
it difficult to use the CBD’s decision to regulate those types of CDR that are seen as 
problematic. Suggestions for ameliorating this situation were to make sure that the IPCC’s 
future definitions would differentiate CDR technologies according to their ecological and 
social sustainability, and to introduce a corresponding amendment to the CBD’s decision. 
 
The observations used for this case are a snapshot of the reasoning process that took place 
amongst a small group of like-minded policy makers developing a strategy for international 
engagement. An institutional output could therefore not be observed; instead, the relevant 
outputs of the workshop are depicted in Figure 3. In this case, the re-definition of CDR 
technologies according to sustainability aspects was relevant both for the participants’ shared 
problem definition and for the institutional context. By aiming to introduce a sustainability 
dimension to the CBD’s and the IPCC’s definition of geoengineering technologies, the officials 
intended to re-shape the global institutional context in order to facilitate regulation according 
to the expectations of their national context. 
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Figure 3: Lack of fit between scientific problem definition and mandate to encourage 
sustainable practices 
 
 
 
Interviews with policy makers clarify the dissonance between scientific demarcation and legal 
architecture. The widely used CDR and SRM categories include both local and familiar 
techniques easily managed within national territory, as well as large-scale interventions with 
transboundary effects. Interviewees mentioned different techniques that were already in use, 
but would fall under the current definition of geoengineering due to their physical mechanism 
(some forms of cloud seeding, and the enhancement of natural carbon sinks). The question then 
arose how to draw a distinction between technologies that were perceived as ethically and 
ecologically problematic, and those that were considered conventional activities.3 
 
This mismatch between scientific distinction and political priorities resonates with what has 
been found in comparable studies. In his analysis of interviews with experts advising the 
European Union, Himmelsbach (2018) writes that “this discrimination between CE proposals 
according to the degree of control, or, as one might argue, ontological complexity, cuts against 
the conventional distinction between the technological families of carbon management and 
solar radiation management. [...] It does, however, align with concerns about which 
technologies might be governable on a national level and which ones would require multilateral 
cooperation” [128]. For this reason, experts as well as policy makers would benefit from 
                                               
3 The reason why this problem is not commonly recognized is because SRM tends to be equated with 
SAI – one approach to increase global reflectivity associated with high impact, high effectiveness and 
high risk. When considering other techniques, such as increasing the reflectivity of roads and 
buildings, impacts and risks are much more similar to approaches like soil-carbon sequestration or 
reforestation. 
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critically assessing the available technology categories with respect to their potential for 
governability. 
Urgency in the Face of Novelty and Reputation 
A second area where institutional fit seems problematic is the urgency narrative invoked to 
advocate for geoengineering governance. In problem definition one, SRM (equated with SAI) 
is characterized as a free-driver problem in which high impact and low cost could lead to 
unilateral deployment without global consent. It is therefore imperative that countries form 
global institutions to prevent this (Stavins & Stowe 2019). A softer version of this argument 
states that SRM is becoming so present on the scientific agenda that the concerns associated 
with it demand robust governance infrastructure at all levels (Chhetri et al. 2018).  
 
In problem definition two, geoengineering (especially SRM, but also some forms of CDR) is 
characterized as a highly uncertain or undesirable policy option that is becoming normalized 
through scientific engagement. This normalization requires urgent attention by states and 
international organizations to avoid ‘sleepwalking toward a geoengineered future’ (Wetter & 
Zundel 2017, 5), or to place the ‘seriously over-optimistic’ expectations linked to CDR in a 
more realistic perspective (EASAC 2018, iv). The case below describes how the plea to initiate 
geoengineering governance has faced barriers with respect to novelty of the idea and concerns 
for state reputation (Figure 4).  
 
The novelty of geoengineering on the climate policy agenda and its accompanying scientific 
uncertainty makes it difficult for policy makers to determine whether geoengineering is indeed 
an issue that deserves political attention. Evidence can be found both in government position 
papers and interviews with policy makers. Thus, German and UK government responses to 
inquiries made by parliamentarians or members of the public name lack of scientific consensus 
as the main reason why governments refrain from judging (Bundestag 2018), or engaging in a 
‘rational debate on’ (BEIS 2018a) the merits or risks of geoengineering technologies. 
Government officials from countries as different as Kenya, Switzerland and China explained 
that they attended scientific conferences because they were looking to better understand the 
status of contemporary research. They usually concluded that the scientific discussions were 
still very confused.  
 
For some, historical tensions between North and South further reinforced the novelty barrier. 
A Kenyan climate negotiator explained that the novelty of SRM and its ideational origins in 
the Global North were likely to make developing countries suspicious. Because of negative 
experiences with promises made and broken in the past, they lacked the trust needed to address 
geoengineering of their own accord. Comparable concerns were expressed by a policy maker 
representing the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) at a scientific conference. She 
explained how the 1.5°C target had been advocated for by SIDS in the midst of destructive 
hurricanes. SRM however had never been part of the debate, and was unlikely to be supported 
in her cultural context. Both officials also stated that the lack of capacity in developing 
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countries to deal even with the most immediate threats of climate change made it questionable 
whether they could substantially engage with something like SRM at all. 
 
Next to novelty, the hubris and risk that is widely associated with geoengineering (in particular 
SRM) poses a threat to countries’ reputation. Officials from European countries like Germany, 
the UK and Switzerland expressed concern about how their government might be perceived if 
it showed too much enthusiasm for SRM technologies. A Swiss diplomat explained that it 
“wouldn’t be bad” if the world community could create clarity and decide what kind of research 
should be allowed. But he also stated that this would be very difficult for a single state to do, 
and that  “immediately, there would be countries that say this is a cheap exit, that you want to 
neglect your mitigation obligations, and solar radiation management is an easy way to do that.” 
 
Because of such reputation concerns, all interviewees thought that state-supported SRM 
research or governance could only be initiated by an actor with substantial climate legitimacy. 
German officials thought it would take a collective like the EU, or a diverse coalition of states 
from around the world, to bring the issue forward. A scientific advisor from the UK suggested 
that such legitimacy might lie with the small island states or the least developed countries, who 
were very serious about climate change. He said he would be very surprised though, if the UK 
took on this issue itself. 
 
Figure 4: Lack of fit between urgent governance call by governance advocates, and novelty 
and reputation concerns amongst policy makers 
 
 
 
Adaptation of the institutional context to support knowledge production while minimizing 
reputational damage could be observed in March 2019, when Switzerland introduced a draft 
resolution on geoengineering governance to UNEA. This resolution was backed by a curious 
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assortment of countries from around the world, none of them major powers, and several of 
them least developed countries. The resolution draft was modest, refraining from any policy 
suggestions. Instead, it cited the function of UNEA to “ensure that emerging environmental 
problems of wide international significance receive appropriate and adequate consideration by 
Governments” and suggested a knowledge gathering exercise to inform further engagement 
with the topic (UNEA 2019). 
 
Despite the efforts of Switzerland and others to create institutional fit, discrepancy in the 
preferences of Parties was too high to allow for an adoption of the resolution. Particularly the 
draft resolution’s association of geoengineering with “potential global risks and adverse 
impacts on environment and sustainable development” and “lack of multilateral control and 
oversight” was distasteful to countries that build their climate policies on BECCS or other 
forms of carbon capture. Saudi Arabia argued that grouping CDR with SRM would lead to 
disproportionate restrictions for carbon capture technologies. The US wanted to place both 
CDR and SRM on par with mitigation and adaptation, characterizing each as a potential 
‘climate strategy’ (Corry 2019). Although the resolution went through several drafts, persistent 
lack of agreement eventually lead to its withdrawal from the negotiation table.   
 
While the barriers of novelty and reputation concerns only become visible through careful 
deliberative analysis, the urgency narrative is pervasive amongst officials who engage with the 
subject. This highlights an important tension. On the one hand, policy makers buy the urgency 
narrative, expressing the need for early international governance. On the other hand, they say 
that the state of scientific knowledge is too preliminary to even qualify for political discussion.4 
Concerns for reputation add another layer of complexity. Environmentally concerned and 
technologically advanced countries fear reputation costs if they engage too positively with 
geoengineering. Developing countries lack scientific capacity and trust in new promises 
promoted by western scientists. Yet with the recent breach of geoengineering at UNEA, the 
problem of uncertainty becomes less pronounced. The Swiss initiative has opened a path for 
larger, more powerful actors to enter the arena. These no longer need to fear for their reputation 
and can point to the failed UNEA resolution as an issue that deserves further discussion. How 
deliberations on this front will continue remains to be seen. 
Risk-Risk Narratives and the Evolving Norms of Environmental 
Governance 
A third area where institutional fit poses difficulties concerns the trade-off language used in 
many geoengineering problem definitions. Particularly the risk-risk trade-off between damage 
from climate change and damage from geoengineering technologies used in problem definition 
one is a difficult sell amidst traditional principles of environmental protection. Norms like 
                                               
4 The outcome of this chicken-and-egg problem is also likely to depend on how much influence pol- 
icy entrepreneurs like the ‘Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Initiative’ (C2G2) or the Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung/ETC group will have in convincing governments to take action. The urgency of 
geoengineering governance seems to be most actively conveyed through non-profit organizations like 
these (albeit using different problem definitions) and both were present at the UNEA conference. 
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preventive action, precaution, polluter pays and the responsibility to avoid transboundary harm 
constitute an influential normative infrastructure that decision makers have learned to navigate 
over many years (Beyerlin 2008). At the same time, the normative expectations at international 
level are changing. This signifies barriers to geoengineering governance in two ways: a lack of 
fit between the risk-risk problem definition and the precautionary principle, but also a conflict 
between the normative contexts of different countries (Figure 5).  
 
Particularly in a European context, the risk-risk narrative of geoengineering stands in stark 
contrast to traditions of minimizing or avoiding risk in environmental policy. For example, 
policy makers in Germany face an institutional legacy of norms that emphasize minimization 
of ecological harm and that are sceptical of large-scale technological or interventionist 
solutions (e.g. nuclear power or genetic modification). Meanwhile, policy makers in China or 
the US work in a context that encourages technological solutions and that have a history of 
large scale environmental interventions. 
 
Figure 5: Lack of fit between risk-risk narrative and normative context of global 
environmental governance 
 
 
 
Falkner & Buzan (2019) remind us that despite the overall institutionalization of environmental 
protection as a primary global norm, the types of policies through which this norm should be 
realized is increasingly open for debate. This development was also evident to political agents 
who engaged in international environmental politics. In a discussion amongst German policy 
makers, experienced international negotiators pointed out that using the precautionary principle 
to justify strict regulation or a moratorium on geoengineering (as desired by their national 
counterparts) would alienate other states and come with a risk of losing influence on the shape 
of the agenda. The UNEA deliberations discussed earlier provide evidence in kind, where 
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resistance to the precautionary principle language was met by surprise (Goering 2019). In order 
to exert influence and maintain goodwill, asking the scientific community to cast light on 
critical aspects of geoengineering technologies was thought to be more effective. In this way, 
concerns could be expressed based on scientific fact rather than on normative principle.5  
 
Addressing geoengineering in a governance context where risks are not well received can be 
done in different ways. One strategy is to separate individual technologies from the 
geoengineering concept entirely. More concretely, governments are careful to avoid these 
terms in their climate strategies, and those technologies with a high-risk profile (SAI or ocean 
iron fertilization) are excluded from national government activity. A clear example can be 
found in the UK government’s policy towards CDR. In a prestigious investment programme 
financed by the UK natural environment research council, CDR is re-named ‘Greenhouse Gas 
Removal’ (GGR) and divorced from the geoengineering label. While the technologies 
subsumed under GGR remain the same as under CDR, the term ‘geoengineering’ or ‘climate 
engineering’ is omitted. In this form and with reference to the Paris Agreement, GGR has 
become an official part of the UK’s clean growth strategy (BEIS 2018b).  
 
As an interviewed official explained, the only reason why the UK government has a public 
statement on geoengineering at all is because citizens and NGOs sometimes write letters of 
concern to their politicians (see BEIS 2018a). These concerns are commonly motivated through 
fears of so-called ‘chemtrails’ – a conspiracy theory about governmental climate and mind 
control, allegedly evident in the condensation trails of conventional aeroplanes. As Cairns 
(2016) discusses, this conspiracy theory has important implications for trust and justification 
in the governance of SRM technologies, and provides further motivation to divorce government 
policy from the geoengineering terminology. 
 
While the separation approach works for technologies that are not (yet) considered overly risky, 
technologies with a public high-risk profile need to be addressed differently. As discussed 
earlier, most governments do not have a position on the governance of ‘ontologically complex’ 
technologies like SAI yet, also because the issue is very new on the governmental agenda. But 
when encouraged to give an opinion on how governance might take place, officials react by 
emphasizing wide-spread participation. Some highlight the need for authority and social 
control in the face of unilateral deployment. Others highlight ethics, stating that those affected 
by the intervention should have a voice in the governance procedure. Still others express 
concerns that interventions should be sustainable, and therefore adhere to collectively 
determined standards. It is interesting to note that rather than highlighting effectiveness and 
efficiency in the governance of SRM, which would call for a mini-lateral option (Victor 2009), 
all policy makers that I spoke to expressed a preference for multilateral solutions.  
 
                                               
5 The direct interaction with scientists in question and answer format was also highlighted by other 
policy makers as particularly helpful. One interviewee described the UNFCCC’s structured expert 
dialogue as “the best thing I have ever experienced in the climate negotiations”. 
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Where negotiation should take place is a different question, and depends somewhat on the 
individual decision makers’ institutional context. Agents versed in global environmental 
governance know that there are variations in the normative underpinnings of different 
international fora, and can anticipate where their own institutional contexts are likely to be 
mirrored. Choice of venue is therefore a way of adapting the institutional context to enable fit 
with a preferred problem definition. For example, negotiators in the CBD can take a more 
sceptical stance towards geoengineering than negotiators in the UNFCCC, as the foundational 
norms of these institutions differ with respect to what is considered appropriate. McGraw 
(2002) notes that the CBD prioritizes national sovereignty and an ecosystem based approach, 
while the UNFCCC prioritizes global cooperation and a science based approach. Furthermore, 
the CBD has a history of restrictively regulating geoengineering research and deployment 
through Decision X/33, while the UNFCCC allows considerable space for CDR through Article 
4.1 of the Paris Agreement.  
 
An example of differences in the institutional venue preference of policy makers can be found 
in the proceedings of the CBD’s COP10, where negotiators discussed a possible 
geoengineering moratorium. Attending members of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin noted that 
while some participants took the issue very seriously, muttering that ‘there are real issues at 
stake here’, others downplayed the process and argued that ‘the real decisions will be taken in 
other fora, most notably the UNFCCC’ (IISD 2010). Legitimation and de-legitimation of these 
fora can be observed again and again at various geoengineering events and conferences. While 
sceptics uphold the CBD’s decision X/33 as an already existing de facto moratorium, 
supporters deny its significance on the basis that it is not legally binding. 
 
Existing norms of global environmental governance constitute important structures in the 
practical assessment of geoengineering governance. It is surprising that they are not more front 
and centre in the corresponding academic literature. With some notable exceptions (Brent et 
al. 2015, Talberg et al. 2018), norms are mostly addressed as something that still needs to be 
developed in order to govern emerging technologies. Yet the work that existing norms do in 
steering government behaviour determines which debates and discussions can be initiated in 
the first place. Instead of assuming a blank slate, future governance assessments could profit 
from taking into account the power of contextual values and principles. 
Conclusion 
What is needed to make geoengineering technologies governable? I argue that in order to 
answer this question, researchers need to study the way in which scientific problem definitions 
match the institutional context of policy makers. My analysis indicates that there are at least 
three areas where common elements of geoengineering problem definitions conflict with the 
institutional setting of policy makers, and provides examples of how policy makers act as 
agents in creating institutional fit. 
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Firstly, the ubiquitous demarcation between technologies according to their manner of 
affecting radiation balance (CDR and SRM) makes it difficult to regulate according to 
politically relevant dimensions such as scale, impact, method of deployment and jurisdiction. 
More useful is the focus on individual technologies. These can be evaluated according to 
politically relevant criteria, including economic co-benefits and social, political and 
environmental compatibility. For now, this is particularly important for CDR, which is reaching 
political agendas through the conclusions and models of the IPCC. The technologies in this 
group have very different levels of normative acceptability, but are often presented as 
exchangeable. An individualized approach enables better integration with other types of 
climate policies and facilitates governance within existing regulatory structures. 
 
Secondly, the urgency with which governance is advocated for conflicts with scientific and 
political uncertainties, making it difficult for policy makers to take initiative. While scientific 
uncertainty impedes the formation of an internal political position, political uncertainty evokes 
concerns for reputation and relations with other actors. The draft resolution on geoengineering 
governance recently discussed at UNEA may have mitigated this problem, as countries were 
compelled to take a political stance. We can expect that more powerful countries will begin 
engaging in the debate soon. 
 
Thirdly, the trade-off narratives in geoengineering problem definitions require experience in 
navigating the normative structures of global environmental governance. Traditional principles 
of precaution and prevention seek to stop environmental harm from happening, rather than 
risking one kind of harm to avoid another. But these traditional environmental ideals are 
increasingly being questioned, and policy makers need to strategically choose both problem 
definition and venue if they want to maintain control of political developments. One way of 
navigating this complex situation is for negotiators to discuss their concerns in a dialogue with 
scientists from multiple disciplines. The UNFCCC’s structured expert dialogue provides a 
good model for this.  
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